1. Milei’s defeat in the Buenos Aires provincial elections marked a turning point in the crisis. The electoral defeat by almost 14 points exceeded even the most pessimistic forecasts, as did the fact that he was beaten in six of the eight electoral districts. If we compare the results of the recent election with those obtained separately by Milei’s La Libertad Avanza party and the PRO (ex president Mauricio Macri’s right wing party that allied itself to Milei’s) in 2023, the resulting drop is of about 13 points. Several studies have concluded that this loss of voters was concentrated especially among the most impoverished sectors, particularly young people, who initially supported the libertarian experiment. This sector mostly turned to abstention, which had a big jump, or to blank votes, which also had significant growth. Thus, the votes received by the government came mainly from the PRO’s historical electorate, made up of the wealthiest sectors. 

2. One of the factors behind the thrashing suffered in the elections was the rapid exhaustion of Milei’s economic plan. For at least several months now, the economy has been in recession, affecting the creation of jobs, consumption, investment, wages, and pensions. The IMF bailout, which the government used to win the Buenos Aires elections in May, has been exhausted with unusual speed. Due to the lifting of currency controls for individuals, coupled with debt payments, the fall in the trade surplus, and purchases abroad, capital flight has reached unprecedented levels. This led to a rise in the price of the dollar, which Milei and finance minister Nicolás Caputo tried to block by raising interest rates to levels three times higher than monthly inflation. Despite this, they were unable to recreate the carry trade, leaving the country on the brink of a currency run and default. It also became clear that the government, far from not issuing currency, as it had promised during its campaign, quadrupled the monetary base by creating various debt instruments in pesos. The debt issued in national currency, which pays criminally excessive interest rates, added to fixed-term deposits and other instruments, represent a very serious threat of inflation. In the past, in a less explosive situation, Macri’s government resorted to the so-called “reprofiling” of the debt. But for the libertarian government, a declaration of covert default would be the end, as would the reestablishment of currency controls. Under these conditions, the scenarios that are opening up are all ones of crisis. The government will seek to reach the elections without devaluating, something that, even if it succeeds, will be at the cost of further deterioration of the economy. For now, high interest rates will aggravate the recession and the indebtedness of businesses and families. Now, if the government fails to make it to the national mid-term parliamentary elections in October without recurring to a devaluation, a devaluation may be imposed de facto, which will initially impact the inflation rate and economic activity. In either scenario, the issue of debt, which is the main factor of economic destabilization, remains unresolved. The country risk, which already exceeds 1,000 points, shows that big capital is aware of the danger of default. It cannot be ruled out that the government will seek a bailout from the Federal Reserve, which had previously announced the possibility of providing additional assistance to that of the IMF. For now, the IMF itself has come out in support of the government, although reports indicate that sectors of international financial capital are urging the government to strengthen its political support base with agreements with governors and the “dialogue-oriented” opposition. As regards a Fed bailout, it is difficult to see how this could be done in record time to influence the campaign, and unless there is a change in the economic model, any bailout is doomed to finance capital flight. It is also very difficult to prevent the current currency run of this magnitude from being transferred to prices and to avoid an inflationary spike before the elections, further undermining the image of the government, whose main political capital was its success in controlling inflation.

3. The other component of the electoral thrashing is the growing popular rejection of the libertarian government. In fact, this rejection has been present since the very beginning of Milei’s government. It was expressed in the first marches and strikes by the CGT, which were later surrendered by passing the Bases law mega-bill; in the mobilizations against the Bases law by militant sectors; in the two large university marches; in the massive March 24 demonstrations throughout the country; in the support achieved by the struggle of pensioners, which was later also expressed in regards to the Garrahan pediatric Hospital strike, in the struggle of people with disabilities and the workers who care for them; in the massive anti-fascist march in response to the hompophobic speech at the Davos forum… These protests, combined with hard-fought struggles by workers against layoffs, for wage negotiations, etc., also explained why Milei’s strength in the previous series of provincial elections would not exceed 30% in the best-case scenario. As a preview of the defeat in Buenos Aires, Libertad Avanza had won only 8% of the votes in the province of Corrientes a few weeks earlier. In this context, the leaking of National Disability Service Director Diego Spagnuolo’s audio recordings detailing Milei and his sister’s corrupt method of million-dollar kickbaks from private labs represented an additional blow, showing that the Milei clique that is persecuting all popular organizations is made up of a gang of thieves.

4. The economic crisis opened cracks within the capitalist bloc that initially supported the government. Although the bulk of the bourgeoisie continues to support the government for its openly anti-worker program, there is a lobby for devaluation of the Peso that includes sectors of agricultural and industrial capital, and demands related to recommencing state-financed public works led by the Chamber of Construction. For now, industrial and agricultural sectors are demanding a devaluation, but only if the government continues with its so-called structural reforms, a demand that is also being made by the IMF for after October, through the proposal of a free float to avoid the definitive liquidation of the reserves lent by them for the payment of the debt. In recent weeks, a clash has erupted with the banks, which reject the requirement reserve ratio increases, which in principle are equivalent to a nationalization of deposits. The imposition of reserve requirements above the historical average (currently at 53.5%, with rumors that they will be raised again) is evidence of an impasse in economic policy, which seeks to avoid a collapse by paralyzing monetary circulation and causing a sharp drop in economic activity. These clashes between the government and different interests of the bourgeoisie are at the root of the emergence of a front of a faction of governors who, even without constituting a unified political force, seek to pressure the government for a change in economic policy and the system of government. We are in the presence of the government of a financial clique that is clashing with a growing sector of the capitalist class. A policy based on an agreement with the governors and the interests they seek to protect is incompatible with a clique-based government centered on Milei, his sister, and a small group of followers. Moving forward in this direction requires much more than a change of names in the cabinet; it implies a fundamental change in the government or, ultimately, of the government itself. For now, a tendency toward political inertia prevails, maintaining the “political table” with Karina Milei, the Menems (Lule Menem, Karina Milei’s right hand man and operator, and Martin Menem, president of the lower chamber of National Congress, both nephews of ex president Carlos Menem), the questioned Sebastián Pareja (who organized the electoral strategy of Milei in the province of Buenos Aires), and they are heading for a clash with the governors with the veto of the bill regulating ATNs (National Treasury Contributions- federal funds channeled to provinces), negotiating one by one with those who are “like-minded,” in a maneuver of dubious effectiveness.

5. Peronism, having gained in strength, is playing a policy of containment of the masses. Evidence of this policy can be seen in the attitude of the union bureaucracy, which remains paralyzed, and of provincial governments, which systematically act against workers’ struggles. It should be noted that [truck driver union leader, Hugo] Moyano signed a collective bargaining agreement that is a real sacrifice at the altar of Milei’s governability, with minimal increases for six months. The main containment maneuver, however, is the campaign for the government to “change” its policy. Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Axel Kiciloff called for a meeting between Milei and the governors, after his victory on the night of the elections. This change that is being demanded would imply a greater willingness to engage in dialogue with the governors, a realignment of the parliamentary blocs to sustain the government’s policies, and a shift in economic policy to meet the needs of the provincial oligarchies and capitalist sectors that have been relatively excluded. As we have argued, the viability of this change is questioned by the very nature of the government. If this operation fails and the economic crisis worsens, a broader containment operation could be launched, including a political reshuffle in an attempt to prevent or contain a popular uprising. In this scenario, it must be taken into account that Vice-President Victoria Villarruel is first in line for succession, and then the maneuvers could reach the PJ (Peronist Party)  itself and the bloc of governors with political leader of Córdoba province and ex candidate for president of right-wing sector of Peronism, Juan Schiaretti, who today are playing in favor of the government’s survival.

6. Overall, the combination of economic bankruptcy, political crisis, corruption scandals, and growing social resistance raises the possibility of an acceleration of the crisis that could put the government’s survival in question. Our slogan “Out with Milei” is, for these reasons, more relevant than in the past. As we pointed out at the time, it served above all as propaganda to show the incompatibility of the government with popular demands and to seek to ensure that the Party, through agitation, empathized with popular sentiment regardless of the balance of forces that existed at the time in the class struggle. Now, however, the slogan takes on another function, which is to show the real possibility of bringing down this strongly anti-worker and reactionary government on all levels, promoting a historic intervention by the masses in the form of popular rebellion and a general strike. To this end, it is important to bear in mind that we have accompanied the slogan “Out with Milei” with “Down with the governors’ austerity policies” in order to also show a channel for provincial struggles and, at the same time, a delimitation of the capitalist proposals embodied by the league of governors and also by Kicillof, the executor of austerity in the Province of Buenos Aires, even though Peronism was the channel for defeat on September 7. Furthermore, the coup attempts and conspiracies cannot be overlooked. Among them, the presence of Vice President Villaruel at Industry Day at the FATE tire factory, owned by Hugo Madanes, a classic exponent of the national bourgeoisie, stood out in recent days. The assembly and the workers’ strike to repudiate her presence, added to the clash with our comrade and SUTNA tire workers union General Secretary, Alejandro Crespo, who handed her a document denouncing her support for the last military dictatorship and for the program of the national bourgeoisie based on labor reform, layoffs, and attacks on wages, had enormous media significance and, above all, strategic value in terms of class demarcation.

7. A major programmatic question emerges, which is the delimitation with a devaluationist solution promoted by part of the bourgeoisie, Peronism, the league of governors, and, of course, the CGT union bureaucracy. The devaluation program is a tool for subjugating the labor movement, which is being called upon to support it with the promise that devaluation will revive the economy, curb imports, and defend local jobs. What is omitted, of course, is that devaluation will immediately hit wages and pensions with accelerated inflation, and that its strategic objective is to reduce wages in dollars. It could trigger an uprising similar to the “Rodrigazo” devaluation plan of the Isabel Perón government in 1975 which was responded with a general strike called for against the policiy of the Peronsit union leadership. It should be added that those who are pushing for devaluation are simultaneously seeking to roll back collective bargaining agreements; in other words, they are in favor of labor reform. Our rejection of devaluation requires the development of a comprehensive program of economic reorganization based on the interests of workers. We reject the dilemma of cheap or expensive currency, or in other words, a high or low dollar, as these are two capitalist policies that end up being paid for by the workers themselves. Our rejection of devaluation is not in the name of maintaining this economic policy, but rather based on a program that proposes the repudiation of the predatory foreign debt, the nationalization of banking and foreign trade, and exchange controls that allow the country’s foreign currency to be used in accordance with an economic plan based on industrialization and increased productivity that is compatible with increases in wages and pensions. The issue of debt, ignored by all capitalist blocs, has taken center stage, as in other periods of acute capitalist crisis, given the absolutely explosive volume it has reached. In July, for example, the Treasury paid four times more in interest and debt principal than it did in pensions and retirement benefits. The much-discussed issue of the fiscal surplus cannot be resolved without repudiating this debt, even if the chainsaw continues to be applied to state social spending.

8. This programmatic debate is key to confronting the winner of Sunday September 7th’s election in the province of Buenos Aires, which is Peronism. Beyond the internal disputes between Kicillof’s and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s factions, both are contributors to a devaluatory policy. This is likely one of the reasons for Peronism’s victory in many agricultural municipalities in the interior of Buenos Aires, which generally vote for forces linked to the PRO or radicalism. The fact that these interests are represented by the PJ on this occasion shows its deeply conservative nature and explains its attitude of complicity with Milei throughout this period, given that the capitalist class wants to influence government policy but not yet end it. The victory of Peronism raises the possibility of a nationwide surge in support for its candidates in the national parliamentary election in October, as long as it is seen as the channel for expressing the rejection of the libertarian government. One scenario to watch closely is to see to what extent the PJ’s victory in the province of Buenos Aires will boost the Peronist ticket in the City of Buenos Aires, which started out weak because of candidates who lack name recognition and appeal among voters. It is also likely that, given the complex and heterogeneous composition of forces in each province, this channel will be contested in each district by other employer forces. In Santa Fe, for example, Radical Governor Maximiliano Pullaro will want to occupy that place, and in Córdoba, the Schiaretti-Governor MArtín Llaryora duo. Among the realignments is the position taken by the governor of Salta, who was the first to refuse to join the governors’ table convened by Milei, after being one of the most vocal collaborators. This fragmented scenario, province by province, shows that Peronism, in the form of Kicillof’s candidacy, does not have a clear path back to national government. Kicillof himself oscillates between a classic Peronist setup and the search for participation in the coalition of governors that includes leaders from the UCR, the PRO, and provincial forces. A priori, it seems unlikely that such a front would combine in an electoral alliance. But if it is currently acting as a safety net, containing and channeling popular protest and discontent, preventing the situation from getting out of hand and calling into question the governability that could undoubtedly be strengthened and activated in the event of a worsening of the crisis leading to an early exit from government. In extreme conditions of this kind, the call may be replicated in a similar way to what happened in 2001, with a legislative assembly and an agreement between Peronism and Radicalism with a common program. 

9. The controversy with Peronism, and more generally with the league of governors, concerns the program for exiting the crisis and that of their past and present collaboration with Milei. None of them are proposing a decisive struggle to defeat him. This will be put to the test immediately in the coming clash over Milei’s vetoes of laws in favor of increasing the budgets and wages in the Universities and the Garrahan Hospital. These vetoes could spark a popular uprising at a time of growing weariness and rejection of the government. While Kicillof asks Milei for a meeting, we must stand out by calling for popular mobilization against the vetoes, organizing in every workplace and school all possible actions that translate the anger expressed in the elections into actions of struggle. The success of the August 16th National Plenary of Unions, Unemployed Workers and Pensioners, taking the initative to marche against the vetoes on Friday, September 12th, which we led from start to finish, sets a course for intervention. With ATE (state workers union) of the Garrahan Hospital and AGD-UBA (union of the professors of the University of Buenos Aires) at the head of all the combative unions, the Polo Obrero piquetero unemployed worker’s organization (with a very important column) and the Frente de Lucha and the organizations of pensioners in struggle, from Congress to Plaza de Mayo, we led the fight against the vetoes, which will have decisive chapters in the coming weeks when the vetoed laws are discussed. At the same time, the day of action in Córdoba, Santa Cruz, and Neuquén was also significant. For the Sutna, which opened the rally in the Plaza in the midst of the PO-led Black Caucus’s election campaign and facing the bosses’ offensive on all fronts, wages and layoffs, it was also very important. We brought to the national stage the condemnation of the bureaucracy of the three central unions and the proposal for an active strike and plan of struggle to defeat Milei, highlighting in our documents and speeches the need for a general strike to oust the government.

10. Another element in the struggle against Milei’s government and in the demarcation from Peronism is the question of Palestine. While Milei is fully aligned with Israel, Peronism neither mobilizes nor supports the cause against genocide, something that must be denounced and included in the campaign itself. Although it is not a focus for its leaders, nor do they participate organically in the mobilizations, groups linked to Peronism are involved, and now a sector of the trade unions is promoting a rally (CTA confederation, Sipreba journalist union, etc.). Peronism was responsible for promoting the adoption of the IHRA’s definitions of anti-Semitism in various official bodies, which are used to persecute those of us who denounce Zionism. In relation to these sectors, we must emphasize that we denounced the genocide from the outset and that we politically support the Palestinian resistance, a point that also sets us apart from the rest of the FIT U- Left Workers Unity Front. Well-organized activities throughout the country allowed us to bring in new comrades. The hearing in defense of Vanina Biasi in the Legislature against legal persecution for the defense of Palestine was a great success, with a huge turnout. Internationally, we have just participated in the Forum for the Right of Return in Iraq and in the trip of Jews for Palestine to the West Bank. These activities allowed us to advance international relations between sectors that denounce genocide. In Argentina, mobilizations are growing and the policy of persecution by Zionism is also developing. Vanina’s case is moving rapidly towards trial. The Court of Cassation recently rejected our appeal and also the recusal of Judge Borinsky, despite his very clear ties to the zionist center in Argentina, the DAIA and zionist journalist Romina Manguel. Across the country, we are planning a major rally on October 7th (as defined by the Committee for Solidarity with Palestine), and preparation activites with Jews for Palestine.

11. The government’s defeat could also serve as an incentive for further struggles. First of all, we are organizing a large mobilization on september 17th in support of the university and Garrahan Hospital. In both places, we are leading these conflicts, as expressed in this week’s reinforced strike at Garrahan, with the ATE Internal Board appealing to the general assembly against the conservative and pro-bureaucratic policy of the MST in the professionals association, as well as in the AGD teach-in that filled the Plaza de Mayo on Wednesday, September 9th. At the university, we promoted the participation of the student movement by starting the occupation of Philosophy and Literature College of the UBA, in addition to our strong support for the teach-in and the national general strike. Our proposal aims at a university rebellion to break the veto. But the effect of the government’s political deterioration will have to be felt all throughout the labor movement. We entered this stage with the momentum of the August 16th national plenary, which brought together militant unions from across the country, delegate bodies, piquetero organizations, pensioners, etc. The first action of this regrouping, on the 12th, was national in character and symbolic as the first mass mobilization after the government’s electoral defeat. The struggles that are developing, such as the enormous battle of the teachers of Santa Cruz province, that of the betrayed outsourced workers of Ternium in the UOM metal workers union, that of the chemical workers of the city of Río Tercero, and the metalworkers of Vasalli who mobilized massively in Firmat, Santa Fe, among many others, are the terrain for the emergence of a new activism, and we must actively intervene to support them, transform these struggles into popular causes, and gain political influence by recruiting activists.

12. The election campaign that we have ahead of us towards October is marked by a crisis of power. This raises an important methodological question, as it means that we are facing a situation that will present opportunities for intervention that we must follow closely in order to take advantage of them. This is not a routine campaign, but rather a matter of following the development of the political crisis in real time and exploiting it with initiatives that allow us to regroup and gain political visibility. In this sense, the development of proposals and political struggle, with events and mobilizations, and with active media and social media coverage of emerging issues, must provide us with a method of intervention in the crisis that allows us to highlight proposals and grow. In the cases where we have launched this kind of initiative, it has been well received. In Córdoba, a press conference helped us gain media presence, and we are making progress with active intervention on social media. In Catamarca, we gained presence in the media and on social media; in Santa Cruz, Gabriela Ance’s candidacy got off to a strong start; and in general, throughout the country, it is clear that if we take the initiative, the political panorama allows us to advance and achieve political gains.

13. In light of this situation, we must analyze the situation of the Left Front. We are not unaware of the PTS’s policy of tailing Kirchnerism, but we must avoid the unilateral view that places it as the only factor that characterizes the FITU in the Argentine political scene. The independent electoral presentation of a left-wing bloc that defends workers’ government in its program, votes differently from Peronism on countless occasions, and participates in direct action by the masses is highly progressive in the current political landscape. An electoral rise of the left, if indeed confirmed, would be highly progressive, even taking into account the contradictory aspects that exist within the FITU. Such a rise would put the programs and strategies of each party to the test in a more open way before the masses. For the Party, intervening forcefully in the electoral campaign is a prerequisite for exploiting the opportunities that the political situation opens up for us. We campaign for votes for the FIT U and we campaign with our own positions to develop the Party, recruit and gain prominence with our program. Regarding the areas of influence in dispute, we must take a careful approach, developing the underlying controversies, such as the PTS’s position for a Labor Party, which is directed at sectors of the Peronist union bureaucracy.

14. In the immediate term, a major battle is focused on organizing the fight against the veto. The mobilization on Wednesday, the 17th, will be a major national day of action. It is already being prepared with actions and assemblies in universities across the country. The mobilization will raise two of the most popular demands of the last period: the struggle of the university and that of the Garrahan Hospital. It is an opportunity for great political agitation throughout the country, and for that we are editing a special statement. We must organize speaking tour of classrooms, tours of hospitals, promote mobilization in schools, and organize plenary sessions and UJS (United Socialist Youths) meetings to strengthen our ranks. A boost in this struggle will allow us to broaden the prospects of the invitation to the UJS congress, which we must promote throughout the country and which will take place on October 4th in the City of Buenos Aires. Within the university struggle, we are placing special emphasis on the agenda of demands of university teachers and non-teaching workers, and we raise the need for a mobilization independent of the CIN- Council of University Deans- cliques, which stifled the movement for a year and now present the struggle as an isolated rally with a program reduced to the repeal of the veto, which, although it would be a blow to the government’s policy, does not ensure an end to the budgetary suffocation.

15. The election of Fitu in the Province of Buenos Aires deserves separate analysis. We encountered a line of resistance that allowed us to renew the two legislative seats we were contesting, albeit by a narrow margin, and we will have to defend the vote in the final recount. In the Third Section, by electing two deputies, our comrade PG will hold the position as parliamentary representative for over than a year and a half, which is very important for us from every point of view, since we are highlighting a new comrade in public activity. We had a very important election in the First Section with Romina del Pla on the top of the ticket, which is also of great importance for the PO, since it also ranked as the third force (tied with Somos), and with little difference from the Third Section, considering that the northern area is a more difficult territory and the candidacy for Senator was not viable as a win for the FIT U. Romina has taken a leap forward, and the joint campaign with Néstor Pitrola allowed us to boost the party in the districts and, in some cases, rebuild our activity. October poses a great challenge: we are at least 40,000 absolute votes short of reaching the threshold for voting in national congressmen, since although turnout rose, it was well below the 2021 midterms. We did well in working-class districts, with Matanza leading the way with more than 7%, but we did not win any of the ten council seats we had in 2021. The political struggle to reach the threshold and get Romina into Congress requires an exceptional mobilization on our part.

16. Party structuring is a central objective of the electoral campaign. In this sense, in each region, there must be an agenda of activities for regrouping by fronts, localities, and neighborhoods, preceded by a great agitational activity, which will allow us to measure the progress of new contacts. And plan participation in the central activities: the UJS congress and, after the elections, the National Women’s Meeting. In the provincial election campaign, we mobilized a significant area if cintactsboth to the August 16 plenary (this applies to many regions of the country) and to the educational plenary and then to control the elections. Now, we must move forward in defining the cotnacts that emerged from that process. In the rest of the country, we have to win over the contacts to actively collaborate with the campaign. To do this, we have to start compiling lists now, so that we can add them to the distribution of our publications and those of our candidates, and to participation in activities. We must finish this campaign with a massive control of the election; it would be a big mistake to abandon the control because of the implementation of the single ballot. We are going to carry out a large-scale registration of controllers starting now in order to fully exploit the collaboration of FIT U supporters and voters and open up contacts on all fronts.

17. One last but fundamental point is the progress of the subscription campaign. The strengthening of contacts must culminate in subscriptions, which must be widespread. We are publicly relaunching the subscription campaign, and we must link it to the development of Prensa Obrera (Workers Press), its national and international articles, and the need to defend a media outlet that denounces every government abuse, that makes no concessions to the opposition, that is a spokesperson for the Palestinian cause, and that is a pillar of leftist positions. It is important to make progress during the month of September in achieving all of our objectives, subscribing internally and externally, in order to achieve self-financing.